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This edition of Eurosurveillance provides a series of 
articles related to polio that present a microcosm of 
some of the issues that have plagued polio eradication 
since the programme first began, and it also provides 
many of the solutions.
Had these and other issues been clearly understood in 
1988 when the World Health Assembly passed the res-
olution that committed all countries to polio eradica-
tion by the year 2000, the decision to eradicate would 
have been more difficult. But fortunately, buoyed by 
the then recent success in the eradication of smallpox, 
active debate on whether to use inactivated or live polio 
vaccines, awareness that many countries had already 
interrupted polio transmission, and unawareness of 
the difficult eradication end game, the resolution was 
passed by consensus of the World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s member states [1]. Although progress towards 
eradication has been slower than anticipated in 1988, 
paralytic polio has decreased from an estimated 1,000 
children per day during 1988, to approximately 400 dur-
ing 2013. Today there remain only three countries with 
endemic polio, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan, and 
the recent risk assessment from the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) reminds us 
that Europe must remain vigilant with strong surveil-
lance and sustained laboratory capacity [2].
The series of polio articles in this edition begins with 
the article by Hindiyeh et al. [3] describing direct sew-
age testing for wild poliovirus antigen, using a multi-
plex quantitative reverse-transcription PCR (qRT-PCR) 
for rapid detection of the virus, directly on concen-
trated sewage samples. When compared to cell culture 
of the same sewage specimens, which is the initial pro-
cess in the gold standard testing protocol for confirma-
tion of polio, sensitivity and specificity of the multiplex 
system were shown to be high. Results were obtained 
in 24 to 48 hours, rather than the usual five to seven 
days required for the culture-based protocol.
The time from collection of a stool sample to analy-
sis for polio virus in polio eradication programmes 
has often been weeks, not days, causing delays in 
response, more widespread transmission, and greater 
and more costly containment efforts. Recently though, 
times from specimen collection to outbreak control 
have decreased considerably by strengthening trans-
port systems from the field to the laboratory, and 
modifying the testing protocol [4]. At the same time, 
there is active research and development of new test-
ing algorithms that can provide more rapid results 
[5]. Hindiyeh et al. have concluded that their qRT-PCR 
system could be a promising application for testing of 
RNA extracted directly from processed stool samples 
from children with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), and it 
remains to be seen whether further study will be con-
ducted along these lines [3].
The article by Manor et al. [6] describes the discovery of 
a silent introduction of wild poliovirus, in the absence 
of detection of AFP in children (the standard surveil-
lance methodology), by what they describe as an early 
warning system of sewage monitoring for poliovirus. 
They point out that this silent introduction occurred in 
a highly immune population in which inactivated polio 
vaccine (IPV) has been used exclusively since 2005, 
and that AFP surveillance alone had not detected this 
introduction and circulation. The authors suggest that 
there is a fundamental role for environmental surveil-
lance in routine monitoring as an early warning system 
in polio-free countries, possibly more sensitive than 
surveillance for AFP. Shulman et al. [7] add greater per-
spective in their report on genetic sequencing of these 
wild polioviruses. It suggests that they were linked to 
strains that were circulating in South Asia and Egypt in 
2012 and concludes that there had been one, or per-
haps more than one, importation event.
Indeed, environmental monitoring in sewage has been 
used by many countries during the past decade, and 
it has identified wild poliovirus imported in 2007 to 
Switzerland from Chad, and in 2013 to Egypt from 
Pakistan [8,9]. Environmental surveillance has been 
a mainstay of polio eradication in several developing 
countries as well, for example in Egypt and India, and 
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its wider role in the polio eradication end game contin-
ues to be assessed [10]. 
Van der Maas et al. [11] and Yakovenko et al. [12] dis-
cuss the importance of maintaining high polio immu-
nity levels in order to prevent re-establishment of 
circulation of wild poliovirus, and the vulnerability of 
countries with lower than optimal population immu-
nity in the general population or with pockets of low 
coverage such as those in certain religious and other 
groups. They clearly call attention to the fact that the 
circulation of wild poliovirus in one country is a threat 
to all others, and that vaccination coverage, using 
either IVP or oral polio vaccine (OPV), must be main-
tained until the circulation of all wild poliovirus has 
been interrupted. Yakovenko et al. also underscore the 
fact that adults are at risk from imported polio virus, 
having isolated wild poliovirus from adults with AFP in 
the Tajikistan outbreak [12]. 
A recent polio outbreak also provided a clear demon-
stration that adults are at risk of paralytic polio during 
outbreaks. Because adult populations in Namibia had 
not been vaccinated against polio in the period before 
independence, and had not developed immunity by 
exposure to poliovirus because of high quality water 
and sanitation systems, an importation of wild polio-
virus led to an outbreak of paralytic polio in adults in 
2006 [13]. 
Other issues that have been important to polio eradi-
cation such as circulating vaccine derived poliovirus 
(cVDPD) are not discussed in this series, although the 
ease with which the poliovirus recombines in nature 
was demonstrated by studies of viral sequences in the 
Tajikistan outbreak [12]. However, this omission from 
the series does not minimise the importance of cVDPV 
as a challenge to polio eradication that the end game 
will take into account [14]. The decision in Israel to 
reintroduce OPV after failure to interrupt transmission 
with IPV, foretells the complexity the end game will 
face in the event of a reintroduction after eradication 
has occurred. Outbreak containment strategies for all 
countries are actively being assessed for application 
during the post-eradication period [15]. 
Although solutions to most of the technical problems 
in polio eradication are either available or under devel-
opment, risk communication and gaining trust in polio 
vaccination in the absence of paralytic disease remain 
a major challenge. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
experience described by Kaliner et al. [16] in develop-
ing trust and paving the way for the supplementary 
immunisation activities that reintroduce OPV several 
years after having switched to IPV in routine vaccina-
tion programmes.
The importance of trust and risk communication has 
likewise been clearly demonstrated in the past, when 
in 2003 polio vaccination was stopped in northern 
Nigeria because of false rumours, many of which were 
circulating on the world wide web, that the vaccine 
was being used in a plot by some Western nations to 
permanently sterilise young Muslim girls, and in some 
instances that it was associated with the introduction 
of AIDS [17]. Although there may have been other rea-
sons than concern over vaccine safety, the governor of 
one northern state in Nigeria interrupted polio eradica-
tion activities, and other northern Nigerian states fol-
lowed. Within months, polio had spread from Nigeria 
to neighbouring countries, to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 
and from there on to Indonesia [18].
All of the countries affected were members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference who, at their 
October 2003 summit in Malaysia, adopted a resolution 
that endorsed and promoted stronger polio eradica-
tion activities [19]. Religious leaders became involved 
as well, and promoted polio vaccination through a 
series of fatwas and other declarations. Countries that 
had been free of polio, again had children paralysed 
by poliovirus, and increased their surveillance and 
conducted supplementary immunisation activities to 
prevent the virus from becoming endemic again. They 
were successful in containing wild poliovirus and inter-
rupting its transmission, but at great financial cost to 
the countries and the polio partnership. 
This series of articles on polio is a timely reminder that 
polio eradication has not yet been completed, and they 
confirm that eradication is technically feasible. But 
obstacles to polio eradication remain. Killings of polio 
workers in Pakistan and northern Nigeria have caused 
fear among polio workers, and pose a risk to the life of 
those who vaccinate door to door. These incidents have 
prompted a call for action from the Muslim world to 
counter opposition to the polio eradication programme 
recently published in The Lancet [20].
Civil unrest, such as that caused by the killing of polio 
workers, has occurred in the past, but was never tar-
geted specifically at polio eradication. In Sudan in 
2005, for example, the United Nations called for days 
of tranquillity so that polio and other vaccinations 
could continue [21]. But the solution to violence tar-
geted at the global eradication of polio and at vac-
cination programmes in general, requires more than 
vaccine supplies, door-to-door vaccination, and metic-
ulous surveillance. It requires collective ownership and 
solidarity by all countries, and it may need a prominent 
and accepted figure in all countries where opposition 
has been observed, to step forward as a leader and 
bring polio eradication to completion. 
In the meantime, European countries must continue to 
maintain high levels of polio vaccination coverage, and 
sustained surveillance of AFP with laboratory support, 
in order to ensure that wild poliovirus, if imported, is 
rapidly detected and completely contained.
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